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NO. 48888-2021
Ada County
Case No. CR01-20-24782

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Thomas Walsh failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion
when it imposed a sentence of ten years with four years determinate upon his conviction for felony
DUI?
ARGUMENT
Walsh Has Failed to Show that the District Court Abused Its Discretion
A.

Introduction
Following a traffic stop, a Boise police deputy observed a “strong odor of an alcoholic

beverage emanating from the vehicle” driven by Thomas Walsh. (PSI, pp. 1, 73.) Upon asking
for his driver’s license, Walsh volunteered, “I’ll tell you straight up I had a drink or two.” (PSI, p.
76.) The deputy asked if the aluminum can he had previously seen Walsh drinking from contained

alcohol and Walsh confirmed it did. (PSI, p. 76.) The deputy observed Walsh’s “eyes were
droopy, glassy and bloodshot,” and “his speech was slightly slurred.” (PSI, pp. 1, 72-73, 78.) The
deputy asked Walsh to participate in Standardized Field Sobriety Tests, which he failed. (PSI, pp.
1-2, 74, 76-78.) The deputy arrested Walsh and acquired a breath sample to measure his Breath
Alcohol Content, which registered at .206/.196. (PSI, pp. 2, 78-80.) Previously convicted of
felony DUI, police transported Walsh to jail where he was booked, again, for felony DUI. (PSI,
p. 2.)
The state charged Walsh with felony DUI with a persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.
31-32, 38-39.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Walsh pleaded guilty to felony DUI and the state
dismissed the persistent violator charge. (R., pp. 50-62.) The district court imposed a sentence of
ten years, four fixed, to run concurrently with Walsh’s 2006 sentences for felony DUI and leaving
the scene of an injury accident (hereafter DUI/Injury Convictions). (R., pp. 71-73.)
Walsh filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 78-80.)
Walsh challenges the district court’s decision to sentence him to an aggregate ten year
sentence with four years determinate. Walsh has failed to show an abuse of discretion.
B.

Standard of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the

defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007)
(citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho
201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)). Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the
burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577,
38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). In
evaluating whether a lower court abused its discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part
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inquiry, which asks “whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the
exercise of reason.”

State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018)

(citing Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).
C.

Walsh Has Shown No Abuse of the Court’s Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish

that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive. State v. Farwell, 144
Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). In determining whether the appellant met this burden,
the court considers the entire sentence but, because the decision to release the defendant on parole
is exclusively the province of the executive branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be
the period of actual incarceration. State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017)
(citing Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 391). To establish that the sentence was excessive,
the appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was
appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation,
and retribution. Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. A sentence is reasonable “‘if it appears
necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of
the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.’” Bailey, 161 Idaho at 895-96, 392
P.3d at 1236-37 (quoting State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015)).
The district court’s factual finding and reasoning for its sentence show no abuse of
discretion. At the sentencing hearing, the district court considered protection of the community
(Tr., p. 26, Ls. 21-22), deterrence (Tr., p. 26, Ls. 9-20), and punishment (Tr., p. 26, Ls. 4-8). The
district court stated its purpose was not to “get [Walsh] off booze” but to make sure he understood
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he “can’t get behind the wheel of a car after [he’d] been drinking.” (Tr., p. 27, Ls. 4-7.) The
district court imposed the fixed portion recommended by the state but considered the
recommendation “generous” in regards to deterrence and punishment. (Tr., p. 28, Ls. 15-19.)
Walsh, the district court found, knew he could go back to prison “for a lot longer than four years.
And, yet, [he] chose to [drive drunk] anyway. Spending another four years in prison will hopefully
get it through [his] head that there are consequences to [his] decisions even when [he’s] drunk
when [he] make[s] them.” (Tr., p. 28, Ls. 20-25.)
Walsh claims the district court should have retained jurisdiction or imposed a more lenient
fixed term in light of mitigating factors including his long history of substance abuse, “remorse
and acceptance of responsibility, his support from family and friends, and his ability to maintain
gainful employment.” (Appellant’s Brief, p. 4.) Walsh’s claims are unpersuasive.
Walsh asserts he “has never had trouble maintaining steady employment.” (Appellant’s
Brief, p. 5.) The record, however, shows Walsh’s drinking cost him his job. In late 2018, Recovery
4 Life informed Walsh’s parole officer that Walsh had received treatment for approximately one
month from Recovery 4 Life, an outpatient alcohol treatment program, “to prove to [his] employer
that he is getting assistance.” (PSI, pp. 4, 53-57.) Though Walsh told the presentence investigator
he left his job of ten years “voluntarily because he wanted a change,” it was in fact his problematic
drinking which his employer said “ultimately … cost him his position.” (PSI, p. 4.) His IDOC
Education Summary shows a nearly six month gap between jobs. (PSI, p. 65.)
Appellant also states he “has stayed out of trouble since his release from prison in 2009.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.) The record reflects otherwise. The “cracks in the façade” of Walsh’s
“successful” time on parole began to show years prior when law enforcement observed Walsh
intoxicated at a bar in 2014, had contact with him in 2016 while intoxicated, and arrested him in
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2018 for disorderly conduct when he drunkenly pounded on the door of a woman’s home at two
in the morning. (PSI, pp. 3, 5, 53, 57, 67-68.) In that event, Walsh ultimately received an infraction
for trespassing. (iCourt CR01-18-40564, State v. Walsh; PSI, pp. 4, 53, 55, 57.) His parole officer
summarized the incident, stating “Walsh was so intoxicated he could not understand why [Boise
Police Department] was arresting him or the explanation of what he was doing was frightening the
woman of the house he was pounding on the door at 2am in the morning!!!” (PSI, pp. 4, 57.)
Now

Walsh has committed crimes fueled by his alcohol addiction since he was a

teenager. (PSI, pp. 1-3, 8-9, 13-17, 22-25.) In the 2006 PSI report, Walsh’s mother thought the
DUI/Injury convictions case had “been a ‘wake-up’ call for her son” yet acknowledged he had
already “been given multiple chances in the past.” (PSI, p. 10.) Fifteen years later, Walsh’s mother
would write to a judge again, explaining Walsh is “tired of poor choices and … is ready to make
positive and responsible changes in his life,” pleading for “new treatment programing” for her son.
(PSI, p. 47.) Sadly, in the 2002 PSI report, she likewise pleaded that the “consequences of [the
2001 DUI case], will [e]ffect the financial status and lives of” Walsh’s wife and their new baby.
(PSI, pp. 18-19.) “If [Walsh] goes to jail for a period of time, not only can I not afford our house
all be myself, I’d have to figure out how to get to daycare without a car,” Walsh’s wife told the
court. “[Our baby] is also very close to her dad and would surely have a rough time adjusting to
his absence.” (PSI, p. 19.) Twenty years later, in the present case, Walsh’s current romantic
partner wrote “our children and myself included, rely on [Walsh] as father and spouse for … the
basic necessities.” (PSI, p. 48.) Knowing the consequences of his actions, Walsh continues to
drink and drive, putting the community at risk and destabilizing his family again and again.
The present case is Walsh’s fifth felony conviction, three of which are for driving while
under the influence of alcohol. (PSI, pp. 2-3, 8-9, 13.) His other felonies stem from leaving the
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scene of an injury accident and grand theft, in which he attempted to steal skis after “drinking a
couple of beers.” (PSI, pp. 3, 8, 22.) His DUI/Injury convictions – in which Walsh drove while
intoxicated, caused an accident with another vehicle, and fled the scene – resulted in “great bodily
harm and/or permanent disfigurement” of a mother who was driving with her

son

and the infant child of a friend. (PSI, pp. 8-9.) The victim in that case described Walsh “exiting
his vehicle and screaming at her,” which was “extremely upsetting to her son.” (PSI, p. 9.) The
infant subsequently experienced seizures, frequent vomiting, and excess fluid on the brain. (PSI,
p. 9.) The infant’s mother could not, at the time, definitively state that her infant’s symptoms were
related to the collision, but “expressed anger and dismay that anyone with [Walsh’s] extensive
record would have been driving or had a license.” (PSI, p. 9.) Walsh had nearly completed his
term on parole in that case when he was arrested for the present offense. (PSI, p. 3.)
Since entering the criminal justice system, Walsh has been ordered to attend alcohol abuse
programs, alcohol intervention services, DUI educational classes, numerous mental health
programs, and a substance abuse treatment program while serving a retained jurisdiction. (PSI,
pp. 5, 17, 19, 30-31, 33.) After his release on parole in 2009, Walsh completed two outpatient
treatment programs and one inpatient treatment program through the Idaho Department of
Corrections, outpatient treatment through Easter Seals-Goodwill, and attended Alcoholics
Anonymous meetings. (PSI, p. 4-5.) He asked for, and was denied, the opportunity for another
retained jurisdiction after his DUI/Injury convictions, and contends the district court should have
granted a retained jurisdiction in the present case. (PSI, p. 10; Appellant’s Brief, pp. 1, 4, 6.)
During the sentencing hearing, Walsh asked the district court for the opportunity for a retained
jurisdiction as “that one last chance.” (Tr., p. 25, Ls. 19-21.) The district court acknowledged
Walsh’s request and noted it was “unfortunate” Walsh didn’t think about his opportunities when
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he was drinking alcohol on what the district court presumed “to be a fairly regular basis between
at least 2014 and when [Walsh] got caught for [the present] offense.” (Tr., p. 30, Ls. 8-13.)
Treatment has always been available to Walsh, but time after time he has chosen to return to
alcohol to “soothe” himself in times of stress. (PSI, p. 5; Tr., p. 25, Ls. 11-13.)
For decades, Walsh has put the public at risk by continuing to drink and get behind the
wheel of a vehicle. The loss of his job, family, and freedom has yet to convince Walsh that
sustained sobriety is his only option to lead a productive, law-abiding life. Treatment programs
for alcohol addiction are available for anyone who seeks them, but time after time Walsh has
decided to drink and drive, putting himself, his family, and his community at risk. In consideration
of the need to protect society from his dangerous behavior and the need for punishment and
deterrence, the district court acted reasonably and upheld its responsibilities when it imposed a ten
year sentence, four years fixed, upon Walsh.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 20th day of December, 2021

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
MOLLY GARNER
Paralegal
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 20th day of December, 2021, served a true and
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of
iCourt File and Serve:
KILEY A. HEFFNER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN

Deputy Attorney General
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